We examine the evolution of international currency exposures, with a particular focus on the 2002-2012 period. We show that there was a widespread shift towards positive net foreign currency positions, such that relatively few countries exhibited the archetypal emerging-market "short foreign currency" position on the eve of the global financial crisis. Finally, we explore the distribution of currency-generated valuation effects during the global financial crisis.
Introduction
International currency exposures vary across countries and over time, due to differences in the scale and composition of international balance sheets. Historically, a long-standing distinction was made between advanced economies that could issue domestic-currency liabilities to foreign investors and emerging economies that could only obtain foreigncurrency loans. For the former group, unanticipated currency depreciation conferred a valuation gain by increasing the local-currency value of foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities. For the latter group, currency depreciation induced adverse balance sheet effects.
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However, in the wake of the 1990s emerging market crises, the international currency exposures of the latter group has sharply changed. A combination of current account surpluses, the accumulation of foreign-currency official reserve assets, a shift from debtbased to equity-based liability funding and success in building local-currency debt markets resulted in improved net foreign currency positions in the run up the global financial crisis (Lane and Shambaugh 2010a) . Accordingly, these countries were better positioned to absorb this global shock, since currency depreciation could be deployed to counter the external shock without worrying about adverse balance sheet effects.
At the same time, there was rapid growth in the external balance sheets of advanced economies during the pre-crisis period (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007a , 2008 , Lane 2013a ).
With foreign currencies forming a higher proportion of foreign assets than foreign liabilities, the net foreign currency exposures of advanced economies climbed, such that the valuation impact of a given shift in exchange rates was larger than in earlier periods.
In view of these structural changes and the scale of the exchange rate changes during the global financial crisis in [2008] [2009] , it is important to quantify the contribution of the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment. This is the focus of this paper. Our primary aim is to calculate the valuation impact of currency movements during 2008-2009. To this end, we extend previous work to estimate international currency exposures for 1990-2012 and use these data to calculate the valuation impact of shifts in financiallyweighted exchange rate indices.
In addition, our secondary aim is to ask whether these valuation effects were stabilising from a global perspective. In particular, we examine whether currency-based valuation effects helped to correct excessive external imbalances and/or provided a buffer to domestic macroeconomic and financial shocks. This paper builds on the earlier analysis provided by Shambaugh (2010a, 2010b) . However, the original dataset only extended to 2004, such that post-2004 developments were not covered. In earlier work, the balance sheet implications of exchange rate movements were empirically studied by, amongst many others, Tille (2003) , Eichengreen et al (2003), Goldstein and Turner (2004) , Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) , Milesi-Ferretti (2005, 2007b) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007) . A comprehensive review of the role played by the valuation mechanism in international macroeconomics is provided by Gourinchas and Rey (2014) .
Some recent contributions have inspected various dimensions of the international valuation mechanism in relation to the cross-border distribution of the costs of the [2008] [2009] global financial crisis , Acharya and Schnabl 2010 , European Commission 2010 , Lane 2012 , Lane 2013a , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2014 . In addition, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) , Milesi-Ferretti et al (2010) and Kubelec and Sa (2012) developed estimates of the geographic compostion of international financial crises on the eve of the crisis. However, none of these studies isolated the currency dimension that is the focus of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the analytical framework and the methods behind the construction of the dataset in Section 2. Section 3 describes the evolution of international currency exposures and highlights key stylized facts. The econometric analysis is reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
International Currency Exposures and the Valuation Mechanism
In working out the international balance sheet impact of financial shocks, the valuation channel is a primary transmission mechanism. At a general level, the role of the valuation channel in the dynamics of the external position can be expressed using the following accounting framework. The change in the net foreign asset position between periods t − 1 and t can be written as
where CA it is the current account balance and SF A t is the stock-flow adjustment term.
In turn, the stock-flow adjustment term can be written as
where V AL it is the net capital gain on the existing holdings of foreign assets and liabilities and N ET OT H it captures other non-flow changes to the net international investment position (for example, due to changes in reporting methods and data revisions). At a conceptual level, the V AL it term is a key variable, since it captures the net balance sheet impact of changes in asset prices and market prices (see Gourinchas and Rey 2014 for a survey of the related literature). Accordingly, it should convey a considerable amount of information in relation to the international transmission of financial shocks. Regrettably, just the overall SF A it term is reported for most countries, so that it is not directly possible to infer the values for V AL it and N ET OT H it .
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A standard approach is to split the valuation term between two components
where V ALXR it and V ALM V it respectively capture the net valuation effects of shifts in currency values and asset prices. Of course, as is extensively discussed by Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) , exchange rates and asset prices can be quite correlated, so that the overall impact of a given exchange rate movement depends on the associated response of domestic and foreign asset prices.
Exchange rate movements represent an important potential source of cross-border valuation effects, since the currency composition of foreign assets and foreign liabilites can often be highly asymmetric. Indeed, the rapid expansion in the scale of cross-border investment positions means that currency movements can have potentially large balance sheet effects, in addition to operating through the traditional trade balance channel (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005) .
While the official balance of payments and international investment position data do not record the currency composition of foreign assets and foreign liabilities, Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) show how it is possible to construct estimates of international currency exposures by drawing on a range of datasets and inferential techniques. This involves a two-step process in which the currency composition within individual investment categories are first calculated, before obtaining aggregate exposures by weighting across categories in line with their shares in the international balance sheet.
For equity-type assets, this approach asserts that currency exposures track geographic exposures.
3 Information on the geographical patterns in foreign assets can be obtained from the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for portfolio equity assets, with the IMF's Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) and the UNCTAD bilateral FDI database provide similar data for FDI holdings.
3 The process by which estimates of the currency composition of foreign liabilities are constructed is essentially symmetric.
The CPIS dataset also provides the geographical pattern in portfolio debt assets, while the BIS locational banking statistics contain information on the geography of bank-type debt assets.
4 Since debt issuers in a given country can issue in foreign currencies as well as in domestic currency, the geographical data is combined with country-level and BIS data on the currency denomination of debt instruments to work out the currency exposures in cross-border debt positions.
Finally, estimates of the currency composition of official reserve assets are calculated through a combination of national data sources, COFER data and the implementation of the empirical model developed by Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) .
In the second step, the currency composition data for each category within foreign assets and foreign liabilities are combined to create aggregate weights, using the External Wealth of Nations dataset on the composition of international balance sheets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007) .
The currency weights are given by the formulae
where ω It is possible to define aggregate net financial weights
4 The BIS Statistics Department facilitated access to the underlying geographical and currency patterns in the locational banking data.
where s
are the shares of foreign assets and foreign liabilities in total cross-border holdings. These weights indicate the direction of the valuation impact of a movement in currency j. If the net foreign asset position is zero, this reduces to simply subtracting the liability weights from the asset weights.
In turn, the quantitative exposure of country i to a shift in the bilateral exchange rate between i and j can be simply written as
where IF I it is equal to assets plus liabilities as a percentage of GDP, or the total size of the external balance sheet scaled by GDP, such that the valuation impact can be written
where %∆E ijt is the percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate in period t. In terms of aggregation across all bilateral currency pairs, it is helpful to define assetand liability-weighted currency indices
In turn, the aggregate net financial index can be written as
and the aggregate impact of currency-based valuation effects can be equivalently written
or
In addition, it is also useful to develop a measure of aggregate foreign-currency exposure, which is relevant in capturing the sensitivity of a country's external balance sheet to a uniform movement of its domestic currency against all foreign currencies. We define aggregate foreign currency exposure at the end of period t by
where ω A it is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, s analogously. By construction, the F XAGG index lies in the range (−1, 1), where a value of −1 corresponds to a country that has zero foreign-currency foreign assets and only foreign-currency foreign liabilities (a caricature of the traditional profile of a nonadvanced economy), whereas +1 corresponds to a country that has only foreign-currency foreign assets and only domestic-currency foreign liabilities (a caricature of the traditional profile of an advanced economy with a reserve-status currency).
Aggregate foreign currency exposure captures the sensitivity of a country's portfolio to a uniform currency movement by which the home currency moves proportionally against all foreign currencies. In turn, the quantitative exposure to a uniform shift in the value of the domestic currency against all foreign currencies is given by
such that valuation impact of a hypothetical uniform exchange rate movement against all partner currencies can be calculated by
where %∆E 
Stylised Facts
This section describes the evolution of aggregate and bilateral international currency exposures. In addition, it traces out the scale of V ALXR over 2002-2012 and conducts some counterfactual exercises.
To the extent that a country depreciates after a negative shock, there is an advantage to a net long position in foreign currency, since it acts as a hedge against asymmetric shocks (Lane and Shambaugh 2010b) . Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) showed that the net foreign currency position improved markedly for many countries from the mid-1990s
to 2004. Here, we extend that analysis to demonstrate the continued shift in the run-up to the global financial crisis. The improvements in F XAGG values were most dramatic for emerging market and developing economies, with advanced economies experiencing a smaller increase (see Table   1 ). 6 The median advanced country moves from a F XAGG of 0.07 to 0.08, an almost imperceptible shift while emerging and developing economies shift from a median of -0.30 to positive 0.08. Indeed, it may be surprising to some that F XAGG values were the same for the two groups. In fact, for emerging countries only, the median is even more positive than for the advanced group by 2007, although that ranking may be interpreted as consistent with greater underlying vulnerability to currency and financial shocks in the former group. The improvement in the F XAGG value for emerging and developing countries was driven by two main factors. First, a sequence of current account surpluses meant an improvement in the ratio of foreign assets to foreign liabilities. Second, there was a shift in the composition of foreign liabilities, with foreign-currency debt liabilities replaced by equity-type liabilities.
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Next, we turn to the evolution of N ET F X values. As was shown in equation (13), the N ET F X variable is just the F XAGG index multiplied by the IF I ratio (the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities to GDP) -it expresses the stock of net foreign currency assets as a ratio to GDP. This shows not just the vulnerability of the external balance sheet to uniform exchange rate movements, but also how exposed is an economy to shifts in foreign currency values. That is, a country can be exposed either because of a highly-asymmetric currency portfolio on its balance sheet or due to a very large balance sheet even with relatively close currency matching.
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For emerging markets and developing economies, the trend in N ET F X is very similar to F XAGG, since the scale of international balance sheets for these groups remained relatively stable over this interval, as shown in Figure 2 . It is notable that the median IF I for emerging and developing countries shows a relatively flat increase in the scale while the median for advanced countries climbs significantly, rising to considerably more than four times GDP. Table 1 highlights the striking feature that there has been a large increase in the N ET F X value for advanced economies despite the minor change in the F AXAGG index for this group. Since the overall holdings of foreign assets and foreign liabilities expanded so rapidly during this period, the combination of a relatively-stable currency mix and an expansion in the total scale of the international balance sheet mapped into a much larger net foreign currency position relative to GDP for the typical advanced economy.
In this sense, the build-up of gross positions -not just net positions -was quite important to the growing exposure of these countries to changes in foreign currency.
With this combination, unanticipated currency depreciation (as experienced by advanced countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand during the global crisis) conferred a much larger net valuation gain during this episode relative to historical norms, but countries that appreciated in the crisis (or that held large positive positions in the depreciating currencies) faced substantial losses.
We can summarize this shift over time by examining the 75th and 25th percentiles of the N ET F X distribution as in Figure 3 . We see that few countries are short foreign currency in considerable amounts, but this does not mean that few countries are exposed to foreign currency movements. The large scale of N ET F X seen in the rising value for the 75th percentile means that shifts across currencies could lead to large valuation effects.
These aggregate measures were the focus of Shambaugh (2010a, 2010b) , which focused on a the implications for an individual economy of a uniform shift in its currency against all other currencies. However, the global financial crisis saw wide swings across many currency pairs, suggesting the specific makeup of currency exposure could be quite important in determining the overall valuation impact.
Thus, we now turn to examine bilateral currency exposures. We focus on the weights against the dollar, euro, pound, swiss franc, and yen as well as the aggregate of all other currencies. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the currency weight across countries for each of the five major global currencies while Figure 5 shows the distribution for the holding of all other currencies as well as the aggregate for the 5 global currencies.
A number of general features stand out from Figures 4 and 5. First, almost no countries are short non-global currencies. That is, almost no country borrows in a minor currency other than their own. We can see this in Figure 5 , which shows that many countries have a zero weight on non-global currencies, while around 15 percent of the distribution has a moderately large positive position (for example, Western European countries with significant FDI positions in Central and Eastern Europe). As seen in Figure   4 , almost no countries are short the British Pound. Some countries had accumulated short positions in yen (likely due to carry trade activity that was funded in yen markets).
Almost no countries are long yen (the JGB market is well known for its domestic bias) but around 20 percent have at least a moderate short position.
There are much larger positions against the dollar and the euro, with many countries substantially short against the dollar. Over a quarter of countries have a weight of at least -0.1 on the dollar, and well over 10 percent of the distribution is short by at least a -0.2 weight. Thus, while only 32% of countries were not short foreign currency in the aggregate, more (over 40 percent) were short the dollar.
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Given these exposures and the rapid scale of exchange rate movements in 2008-2009, it is not surprising that there were substantial valuation effects in the crisis. Figure 6 shows both the large and sharply negative V ALXR in 2008 relative to other periods. In the two years immediately preceding the crisis, the 10th percentile of countries faced a loss of 2.6 and 2.1 percent of GDP, while this jumped to 6 percent in 2008. As seen in Table   2 , the average value of V ALXR went from being within 1 percent of GDP of zero in the years before (and after) 2008 to -2.5 percent of GDP in 2008. This was not just due to a few outliers. The median value jumped to -1.5 percent of GDP and the 25th percentile is -4 percent of GDP, suggesting substantial losses for a large number of countries.
Simply looking at scale and not sign, we can see V ALXR was much larger in the crisis than in a typical year. The inter-quartile range of the absolute value of V ALXR jumps from (0.4, 2.1) to (0.9, 4.8). That is, 25 percent of countries faced gains or losses due to exchange rate movements of at least 4.8 percent of GDP. Perhaps more surprising is that the valuation effects were strikingly negative in 2008. While only 32 percent of countries were short foreign currency in aggregate in 2008, not only were median or average losses large, over 75 percent of countries faced currency-generated valuation losses.
In terms of the largest absolute gains and losses, Table 3 shows the top five countries in each category. The United Kingdom and Canada stand out in terms of receiving the largest currency-generated valuation gains, while Japan and the United States endured the largest losses in absolute terms. Table 4 shows the distribution of valuation gains and losses in 2008 relative to foreign currency exposure and exchange rate movements. Forty-eight countries in some sense match the classic story of a depreciation. Nineteen countries were long foreign currency and depreciated against both asset and liability indices and hence had V ALXR gains.
Twenty-nine countries were short foreign currency, depreciated and faced V ALXR losses.
Another seventeen countries had appreciations: three countries were short foreign currency and thus benefited from an appreciation, while twelve countries were long foreign currency and hence lost when their currencies strengthened (including the United States, Japan and Switzerland).
The other countries highlight the importance of the mix of currencies on the balance sheet. These were long foreign currencies in aggregate, but had negative V ALXR.
Twenty depreciate against their liability index but appreciate against their assets. This While the losses and, in some cases, gains were large, these could have been much larger had it not been for the shifts in portfolios in the years prior to the crisis. Figure 9 shows the counterfactual distribution of V ALXR for the same exchange rate change as was experienced in the crisis. That pattern of exchange rate changes is considered against three different balance sheets. 10 It is interesting that the distribution for 1996 and 2002 is quite similar. This is explained by the fact that offsetting developments over that interval canceled out. Countries had less negative F XAGG positions by 2002, but the balance sheets were much larger. If one examines the same F XAGG as were realized in 2002 and 1996, but uses the same balance sheet size as in 2007, the losses in 1996 would have been much larger.
In short, had countries not shifted to a more positive foreign currency position, the crisis could have been much worse.
We next turn to examine not just the size, but the general properties of V AL XR it in the crisis.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we ask whether V ALXR it played a stabilising role during the global financial crisis or, alternatively, contributed to crisis propagation by generating negative wealth effects. In terms of the cross-country distribution, we examine
where Z it represents a range of macro-financial variables. In relation to external adjustment, we can ask whether V ALXR it during the crisis was correlated with measures of pre-crisis external imbalances, as captured by the pre-crisis levels of the net international investment position and the current account balance. In addition to its role in external adjustment, V ALXR it may also be relevant in relation to macroeconomic adjustment and financial adjustment, since a positive external wealth shock (V ALXR it > 0) can provide some buffering in the event of negative domestic shocks (such as declines in domestic output or domestic asset prices). In relation to the 11 We also examined the CAGAP measure of "excessive" imbalances developed by MilesiFerretti (2012, 2014) . The results were generally similar with this alternative measure, which is only available for a smaller set of countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) show an inverse (stabilising) relation between pre-crisis external imbalances and the overall stock-flow adjustment term over 2008-2012. former, we examine the covariation between V ALXR it and growth in output during the crisis. In relation to the latter, we look at its relation with stock returns and long-term interest rates. Tables 6 and 7 show the results. In Table 6 , we run equation (15) for the full sample and the advanced and emerging/developing subsamples. In the full sample and the emerging/developing subsample, the regressors are typically not individually significant.
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However, there is some evidence of a stabilising role for V ALXR vis-à-vis the net international investment position for the advanced subsample in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 . At the same time, in the opposite direction, there is a destabilising positive relation between the current account balance and V ALXR for this group.
13 None of the other regressors are significant for the advanced subsample. Table 7 reports estimates for additional subsamples, where countries are divided between non-peggers and peggers. 14 This may be a relevant sample split to the extent that a stronger correlation between exchange rate movements and macro-financial fundamentals might be expected for the non-peggers than the peggers. Indeed, the only evidence of a stabilising pattern vis-à-vis the net international investment position is for the non-pegger group in column (2) of Table 7 . 15 However, that result is sensitive to the removal of an extreme value (Singapore) in column (3).
Taken together, Tables 6 and 7 The one marginal exception is a positive coefficient on the domestic stockmarket return in for the full sample in column (2) of Table 6 . This pattern is also found for the non-pegger sample in column (3) of Table 7 . However, this is a destabilising pattern in that the countries experiencing the worst stockmarket returns are also experiencing currency-related valuation losses.
13 This also holds if the CAGAP variable is included as an alternative to the unadjusted current account balance.
14 We follow Klein and Shambaugh (2008) in this classification. 15 In column (5), the domestic stockmarket return is marginally significant for the pegger subsample.
over short horizons.
16 Tables 8 and 9 reprise the analysis for the cumulative exchange rate valuation effects for 2008-2012. The patterns in Table 8 are similar to those in Table 6 but the correlations are weaker. The negative relation between the pre-crisis net international investment position is only marginally significant for the advanced country group in column (3) of Table 8 , while there is no pattern in the EMDEV sample.
When splitting the sample by exchange rate regime in Table 9 , however, there is one interesting finding. As in Table 7 , the non-pegged sample only has statistically significant coefficients if Singapore is included. Now, though, the pegged sample actually has a Finally, we examine the relation between V ALXR it and the overall stock-flow adjustment term (V AL it ) in 2008. 17 Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) showed that there was a large positive correlation between the overall valuation effect and the exchange rate valuation effects. The connection is not mechanical. The exchange rate valuation effects are calculated based on currency weights, balance sheet size, and exchange rate changes, while the overall valuation effect is simply the change in the net foreign asset position not explained by current accounts. Thus, the coefficients of over 0.5 in a regression of V AL it on V ALXR it in that paper was in some ways surprising. 
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the recent evolution of international currency exposures, with a special focus on currency-generated valuation effects during the global financial crisis. To this end, we described some key features in an updated and extended dataset on international currency positions over 1990-2012. We highlighted the "normalisation" of foreign currency exposure patterns, with a trend decline in the number of countries running large short foreign-currency positions. At the same time, the increase in the scale of international balance sheets (especially for advanced economies) means that a given exchange rate shift can now generate much larger cross-border wealth effects relative to GDP.
The global financial crisis represents an important testing ground in understanding the distribution of currency-generated valuation effects. Our analysis finds that the scale of these effects were large in 2008 relative to the pre-crisis years and were quite persistent over the 2008-2012 period. Moreover, we find that that exact composition of foreign currency positions mattered during the crisis, with those countries short in US dollars and yen and/or long in Sterling suffering the largest currency-induced valuation losses.
In terms of their contribution to macro-financial stabilisation, there is some limited evidence that currency-based valuation effects moved inversely to pre-crisis net international investment positions. However, that pattern is sensitive to the sample selection and there is little covariation with other macro-financial fundamentals, so that the broader message is that the valuation impact of exchange rate movements is largely orthogonal to other factors. In this sense, our analysis is in line with the large literature on the disconnect between exchange rates and macro-financial fundamentals.
Data Appendix Country list
Uruguay (URY), Vietnam (VNM) and Zambia (ZMB)
Differences with Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) The dataset used here is an update of Lane and Shambaugh (2010a) . That data originally covered the period 1990 to 2004. Here, we extend it to 2012. The empirical methodologies to estimate the currency of denomination of the various IIP items are the same as before. Improvements are mainly related to the use of more up-to-date data releases. This means that data revisions going back in time are taken into account in this version. For instance, we use the latest IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and Lane and External Wealth of Nations (Milesi-Ferretti 2007) data. In terms of the Foreign Direct Investment component, this version also uses the new Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) from the IMF. We take these for the 2009-2012 period. Before 2009 we continue using United Nation's UNCTAD data. Locational BIS bank debt data are a newer version that includes a larger number of reporter countries. The new additions are Canada, Denmark, Greece, India, Indonesia and Korea. Finally, we have improved the estimates for the currency composition of Japanese portfolio debt assets using balance of payments data from the Bank of Japan. As a result, Japanese currency distribution of portfolio debt asset is allowed to vary in time from 2005 onwards. In terms of the overall dataset, the necessary adjustments have been implemented to account for the fact that Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia joined the Eurozone after 2004.
Other data and sources
Here, we give details on the variables used in the econometric analysis section and their sources. Real GDP growth is from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database 2014. Stock-flow adjustment, net foreign assets and current account balance data are from the latest version of the External Wealth of Nations dataset (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007) . The source for stock market returns is MSCi Barra, while long term interest rates are taken from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics data base and from national sources. Exchange rate regime data (peg and no peg) are from Klein and Shambaugh (2008) . 
it is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, s 
it is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, s Klein and Shambaugh (2008) . NFA/GDP (07) Tables 6 and 7, this table fixes GDP at 2007 values to construct VALXR. We do this to prevent the right hand side variables to affect the denominator of VALXR. Note: The correlation coefficient between VAL and VALX for ADV is 0.15 while for EMDEV is 0.2. The regression lines and correlation coefficients are computed excluding Iceland, Switzerland, Singapore and Hong Kong.
